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A MULTIATTRIBUTE UTILITY ANALYSIS OF LEGAL
SYSTEM RESPONSES TO MEDICAL INJURIES
Michael J. Saks,* Daniel Strouse, ** and Nicholas Schweitzer***
INTRODUCTION
The tort system is only one of a number of possible legal responses
to the problem of accidental injuries. If an alternative system can bet-
ter accomplish the desirable goals of the tort system while reducing
undesirable side effects, then that alternative should be preferred.
Any such choice depends, of course, on an accurate assessment of the
relative benefits and harms of the tort system and of the alternatives
to it.
Thanks to empirical research conducted over the past several de-
cades, we can be reasonably sure that quite a lot of discussion about
medical malpractice and corresponding law proceeds on erroneous as-
sumptions, speculations, and anecdotal impressions about the opera-
tion and effects of the existing system. The tort system's most serious
problem in the medical malpractice area is not that plaintiffs bring
claims too readily and too often, or that the system affords relief too
easily, or that the relief granted is overly generous. Rather, the best
empirical evidence indicates that medical treatment is a widespread
cause of avoidable serious injuries and deaths, that very few victims
with an actionable injury bring claims, and that in response to those
valid claims the system typically fails to compensate losses fully or,
most commonly, fails to provide any compensation at all.' Thus,
* Professor of Law, Professor of Psychology, and Faculty Fellow, Center for the Study of
Law, Science, and Technology, Arizona State University; B.A., B.S., Pennsylvania State Univer-
sity, 1969; Ph.D., The Ohio State University, 1975; M.S.L., Yale Law School, 1989.
** Professor of Law and Faculty Fellow, Center for the Study of Law, Science, and Technol-
ogy, Arizona State University; A.B. 1971, S.M. 1977, Harvard University; J.D., University of
Wisconsin, 1980.
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1. See generally INST. OF MED., To ERR Is HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM
(Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000); FRANK SLOAN ET AL., SUING FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
(1993) (and sources cited therein); NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN
JURY (1995) (and sources cited therein); PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRAC-
TICE: MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION (1993):
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health care system providers and consumers enjoy a windfall of lower
costs, paid by others (e.g., negligently injured patients, their families,
first party insurers, social welfare systems) to whom the costs of harm
are externalized. 2 Moreover, what little internalization of losses will
be realized carries with it very high transaction costs. 3 These failings
inevitably lead to under-deterrence of avoidable errors (though this is
offset somewhat by the fear expressed by potential defendants, a fear
that is far out of proportion to the actual risk of being sued for causing
negligent injury or, further, being found liable for such harm).4 Ironi-
cally, then, the shortcomings of the medical malpractice system are
largely the opposite of the imagery held by most of the press, the pub-
lic, and the legislative community: The problem of medical injury is
large and serious while the tort system touches relatively few cases of
actionable injury.5
Alternatives to the tort system are often advanced on the claim (or
the hope) that they will bring about various improvements on some
dimensions.6 The difficulty is that, so far, most of those alternatives
remain either under-studied or untested entirely.7 If nothing else, de-
liberate and limited experimentation with alternatives, including care-
ful empirical evaluation of the performance and effects of the tested
alternatives, should be encouraged. With such evidence in hand, the
performance of various alternatives on multiple dimensions could be
compared to each other and to the tort system, and some conclusions
could be drawn regarding which system would serve society best.
The study reported in this Article is an exploratory attempt to make
those comparisons, notwithstanding the limited data available. As a
proxy for actual data about the performance of the different systems,
we turned to people who have spent important parts of their careers
Michael J. Saks, Medical Malpractice: Facing Real Problems and Finding Real Solutions, 35 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 693 (1994) (reviewing WEILER ET AL.. supra); Paul Weiler, Reforming Medical
Malpractice in a Radically Moderate-and Ethical-Fashion, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 205 (2005).
2. Externalities are costs that are created by an actor's conduct and imposed on others. The
goal of much legal policy is to shift those externalities back to the actor, thereby compelling the
actor to take those into account as part of the cost of the conduct-that is, "internalizing" costs
back onto the party that creates them.
3. See Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litiga-
tion System-And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1281-83 (1992).
4. See sources cited supra note 1.
5. Ironically, most legislative reforms of medical malpractice have been aimed at further insu-
lating tortfeasors from liability and further reducing compensation.
6. E.g., that they will reduce transaction costs, compensate more victims of injury, or reduce
the incidence of injury.
7. See generally BARRY FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW (2d ed. 2000).
[Vol. 54:277
A MULTIATTRIBUTE UTILITY ANALYSIS
generating and studying the empirical data on medical malpractice
and corresponding law, and asked them to use their informed judg-
ments so we could tentatively fill in the knowledge gaps. Then, we
aggregated those judgments. 8 We thereby acquired data on the posi-
tive questions-those exploring the likely impact of the tort system,
and its alternatives, on various criteria of effectiveness.
In order to obtain estimates of the relative importance of those sys-
tem-performance criteria-the normative questions-we also col-
lected data from various groups: ordinary citizens, judges, tort
scholars, physicians in high-risk specialties, physicians in low-risk spe-
cialties, tort plaintiffs' attorneys, and tort defense attorneys. 9 The re-
sponses of these groups were not aggregated, but were examined
separately by group for possible insights into the similarities and dif-
ferences between what different groups believe are the more and less
important features of any legal system response to medical injuries.
The study we present in this Article is by no means a definitive answer
to the questions at hand, but rather it is a model of how one might
approach the comparisons that must be made if the alternatives to the
tort system are to be helpfully appraised and if the legal policy ad-
dressing these alternatives is to be better informed.
II. MULTIATTRIBUTE UTILITY ANALYSIS
The approach we have taken is known as multiattribute utility anal-
ysis (MAUA). MAUA was developed for problems involving multiple
outcomes which must be evaluated simultaneously.10 MAUA facili-
8. Aggregation is supported by the theory that the average of many thermometers gives the
most accurate temperature. Here, aggregation will cancel out each person's random errors and
dilute the nonrandom biases of some of their responses.
9. See infra Part IV.B.
10. Numerous variations on multiattribute utility analysis (MAUA) have been developed, in-
cluding the "dialectic approach." See IAN I. MITROFF & RICHARD 0. MASON, CREATING A
DIALECTICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE: CONCEPT, METHODS, AND MODELS (1981). See generally RICH-
ARD 0. MASON & IAN I. MITROFF, CHALLENGING STRATEGIC PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS: THE-
ORY, CASES, AND TECHNIQUES 35 (1981); THOMAS L. SAATY, THE ANALYTIC HIERARCHY
PROCESS (1980); George Abonyi, SIAM: Strategic Impact and Assumption-Identification Method
for Project, Program, and Policy Planning, 22 TECH. FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE 31 (1982);
Yoram Wind & Thomas L. Saaty, Marketing Applications of the Analytic Hierarchy Process, 26
MGMT. SCI. 641 (1980). These variations apply some common methods, such as system analysis,
stakeholder analysis, tree diagramming, weighting and scaling, normalized scoring, qualitative
judgements, and others. See generally WARD EDWARDS & J. ROBERT NEWMAN, MULTIAT-
TRIBUTE EVALUATION (Sage Univ., Quantitative Applications in the Soc. Sciences Series No. 26,
1982); MARCIA GUI-ENTAG ET AL., HANDBOOK OF EVALUATION RESEARCH (Marcia Guttentag
& Elmer L. Streuning eds., 1975); James S. Dyer et al., Multiple Criteria Decision Making, Mul-
tiattribute Utility Theory: The Next Ten Years, 38 MGMT. SCI. 645 (1992); Ward Edwards, How to
Use Multiattribute Utility Measurement for Social Decisionmaking, 7 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON
2005] 279
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tates the rational comparison of an array of different choices (con-
cerning for example, materials, technologies, organizational practices,
legal policies) which lead to an array of different outcomes." MAUA
accommodates the use of empirical data when available, or the judg-
ments of experts when empirical data are not available.' 2 MAUA also
makes explicit the contribution of known or estimated empirical rela-
tionships on the one hand, and normative values on the other hand:
which outcomes are valued more and which are valued less?1 3 By
weighting the effects by the values associated with each attribute of an
option, MAUA results in the calculation of "utilities" which reflect the
aggregate desirability of each of the several options compared.1 4
Consider this illustration: How would you determine the "best" ma-
terial from which to build a rocket to carry your rover to Mars? Using
MAUA you would: (1) define the attributes of interest for the mate-
rial-strength, weight, cost, retention of properties under changing
conditions (e.g., temperature, gravity, radiation), and so on; (2) iden-
tify candidate materials and obtain measures of their performance on
each of the attributes of interest; (3) obtain measures of the relative
importance of each of the attributes; and (4) finally, by weighting the
performance of each material on each attribute (step 2) by the impor-
tance of each attribute (step 3), obtain a measure of the utility of each
material for the task at hand.15 The material with the highest summed
utility would then be the best choice.16
Similar analyses can be, and have been, carried out in a variety of
fields, from materials science to business planning to policy analysis.' 7
In the present study, we used MAUA to compare different possible
legal responses relating to the problem of medical injuries, with the
goal of identifying those that yielded the highest utilities.
As the Mars rover-rocket example shows, utility is a function not
only of the empirical characteristics of a material (or technology or
policy)-the attributes or criteria-but also of the values associated
with each attribute or criterion. These values, even if empirically in-
formed, are ultimately normative in nature; they represent a judgment
that a particular attribute or criterion is more or less important, desir-
SYSTEMS, MAN & CYBERNETICS 326 (1977); Ralph L. Keeney, The Art of Assessing Multiat-
tribute Utility Functions, 19 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 267 (1977).
11. See generally EDWARDS & NEWMAN, supra note 10; GUYIFENTAG ET AL., supra note 10.
12. EDWARDS & NEWMAN, supra note 10, at 8.
13. Id. at 52-53.
14. Id. at 65.
15. In this instance, that is selecting a material for a rocket.
16. Assuming, of course, that everything that went into the calculation is correct.
17. See sources cited supra note 10.
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able, or meritorious than another. Because MAUA separates facts
from values, the results are better insulated from any preconceived
preferences of decisionmakers.' 8 This virtue of MAUA is, of course,
likely to be most present when actual empirical relationships are ob-
tained and then weighted by normative ratings which are themselves
dictated by relatively objective concerns (e.g., the desire for a material
that is strong and light). In a study such as ours, the "facts" are the
informed opinions and speculations of experts, and the normative
dimensions are not compelled by physical reality, but rather by policy
preferences (e.g., the extent of demand for a system that emphasizes
deterrence over compensation, or vice versa). Even in such circum-
stances, however, by separating the "facts" from the values-by col-
lecting data in separate phases of the study from different sets of
respondents being asked questions framed to elicit only one or the
other kind of information-all respondents are, to some extent,
placed behind a veil of ignorance. 19
Particularly in regard to social and legal policy, different people or
groups might hold different values. Those differences could affect the
conclusions reached as to which systems have the greatest utility, and
therefore such differences need to be studied. This illustrates one
kind of sensitivity analysis to which MAUA should be subjected in
order to find robust conclusions.
III. MEDICAL INJURY RESPONSE SYSTEM OPTIONS AND
EVALUATION CRITERIA
Our MAUA was concerned with the evaluation of different systems
of legal responses to medical injury by using a set of criteria widely
regarded as relevant to such evaluation.
20
A. Systems
We identified and described six different legal systems through
which redress for medical injuries might be approached. Some of the
systems currently exist, in varying or partial form, among the states or
within particular health care delivery sectors;21 others are policy pro-
posals not yet implemented.2 2 We recognize that views differ (albeit
not greatly) as to which of the proposed alternatives to traditional tort
18. See generally GUTrENTAG ET AL., supra note 10.
19. Those who give empirical ratings do not know what the normative ratings will be and vice
versa.
20. See infra Part III.B.
21. E.g., traditional tort and binding arbitration.
22. E.g., no-fault and enterprise liability.
2005]
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law merit independent consideration, and how best to characterize
them.23 Accordingly, we sought to present a fairly broad range of op-
tions. To ensure common understanding among respondents, we pro-
vided system descriptions closely reflecting those that follow.
First is the "traditional" American tort system, in which an injured
patient seeking compensation must file a judicial claim against the
person(s) and institution(s) believed to be responsible. 24 The great
majority of claims are resolved prior to trial, but if the claim goes for-
ward, the claimant must ordinarily prove the following: a patient-pro-
vider relationship, usually contractual, existed with the physician or
other defendant; the provider owed a duty to the claimant; the pro-
vider breached the duty by failing to meet the applicable professional
standard of care; and the provider's breach caused the claimant's
harm and damages. 25 Notwithstanding that complexities and excep-
tions (and "reforms") 26 exist in connection with many of these key
elements, the "traditional" fault-based tort system has long served as
the baseline against which proposals for all alternative systems are
compared.27
The second category is the "modified" or "reformed" tort system.28
Of course, traditional tort law has never been static. But many state
legislatures (and, to a lesser extent, courts), in response to perceived
crises in tort litigation generally and in malpractice litigation in partic-
ular, have recently modified substantive and procedural rules in hopes
23. For example, compare our typology with that in David M. Studdert et al., Health Policy
Report: Medical Malpractice, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 283, 287-90 (2004). The authors identify
three main categories of systemic-reform proposals: (1) alternative dispute resolution (which
embraces our sixth system: arbitration); (2) "no-fault" or other alternatives to prove negligence
(our fourth and fifth systems); and (3) enterprise liability (our third system). Id. Whereas we
treat "reformed tort" as an alternative system (our second), they simply describe key features of
tort reform-modifications to the current regime that limit access to court, modify liability rules,
and limit the size of awards-all of which are, in substance, elements of our reformed tort "sys-
tem." Conversely, Studdert and colleagues include (as one reform within their alternative dis-
pute resolution category) the fault-based administrative system of compensation that originated
with the American Medical Association (AMA), a proposed reform that we omit. See Studdert
et al., supra, at 289 n.90. See also PAUL C. WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL 114-22
(1991); Kirk B. Johnson et al., A Fault-Based Administrative Alternative for Resolving Medical
Malpractice Claims, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1365 (1989). We chose to omit this alternative because,
due to its low cost and accessibility, the AMA has come to recognize that it has the potential to
attract a vastly increased number of meritorious, currently unfiled claims, which has led the
organization itself to stop promoting it. MARK A. HALL ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW & ETHICS
358 (6th ed. 2003).
24. See WEILER ET AL., supra note 1, at 136.
25. Id. at 14, 136; Studdert et al., supra note 23, at 283.
26. See supra text accompanying notes 11-17.
27. See WEILER ET AL., supra note 1, at 136.
28. See generally FURROW ET AL., supra note 7.
[Vol. 54:277
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of achieving one or more reform goals.29 Reforms commonly enacted
in this period include caps on general damages,30 shortened statutes of
limitations, 31 limits on collateral source recovery,32 limits on attor-
neys' contingency fees,33 changes in the applicable standard of care,
34
periodic (rather than lump-sum) payment of damages awards,35 elimi-
nation of the ad damnum clause in tort complaints,36 and the like. We
recognize that this "system" is a general aggregation-perhaps a
"grab bag"-of reforms, and that perhaps not all of these reforms
even move in the same legal direction. Nonetheless, we asked respon-
dents to do their best to evaluate "reformed tort" as a general cate-
gory, identifying (and, in some cases, briefly explaining) the examples
noted above.
The third approach, enterprise liability, retains the traditional tort
system and its core doctrines, but differs in that only the health care
organization-hospital, hospital system, or managed care organiza-
tion-with which the physician is affiliated can be held liable. 37 Physi-
cians cannot be held personally liable (unless acting without any
29. Reducing the incidence of claims or likelihood of plaintiff success, or amount of awards.
30. In many states, general ("non-economic" or "pain-and-suffering") damages have been
limited to a statutory maximum, such as $250,000, $500,000, or $1,000,000. See FURROW ET AL.,
supra note 7, at 352; Randall R. Bovbjerg, Legislation on Medical Malpractice: Further Develop-
ments and a Preliminary Report Card, 22 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 499, 525 (1989); Eleanor D. Kin-
ney, Malpractice Reforms in the 1990s: Past Disappointments, Future Success?, 20 J. HEALTH
POL. POL'Y & L. 99 (1995).
31. FURROW ET AL., supra note 7, at 351; Bovbjerg, supra note 30, at 524.
32. This involves the permissive or mandatory subtraction from a plaintiff's damages of any
amount also paid from sources "collateral" to the tort award, in order to avoid "double" recov-
ery. Examples of such sources include health, disability, and life insurance. See FURROW ET AL.,
supra note 7, at 352; Bovbjerg, supra note 30, at 522.
33. Limitations are imposed on the percentage of a plaintiff's award that may be collected by
the plaintiff's attorney, either in accordance with a statutory schedule or by individualized judi-
cial oversight. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 7, at 351; Bovbjerg, supra note 30, at 522.
34. In some states, legislatures have statutorily interrupted judicial trends toward "raising" the
applicable standard of care (e.g., by legislatively reinstating "local" practice norms in place of
judically-developed "national" norms) and toward relaxing traditional requirements for expert
testimony. Legislatures have also sought to narrow liability by other substantive rule changes:
abolishing health care "battery" claims, reducing the scope of informed consent claims, restrict-
ing res ipsa loquitur, etc. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 7, at 351; Bovbjerg, supra note 30, at
522-24; Studdert et al., supra note 23, at 287-88.
35. FURROW ET AL., supra note 7, at 352; Bovbjerg, supra note 30, at 526-27.
36. FURROW ET AL., supra note 7, at 351.
37. WEILER, supra note 23, at 122-32; Kenneth S. Abraham & Paul C. Weiler, Enterprise
Medical Liability and the Choice of the Responsible Enterprise, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 29 (1994);
Kenneth S. Abraham & Paul C. Weiler, Enterprise Medical Liability and the Evolution of the
American Health Care System, 108 HARV. L. REV. 381 (1994); William M. Sage & James M.
Jorling, A World That Won't Stand Still: Enterprise Liability by Private Contract, 43 DEPAUL L.
REV. 1007 (1994); William M. Sage et al., Enterprise Liability for Medical Malpractice and Health
Care Quality Improvement, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 1 (1994).
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organizational nexus). Under this system, institutional liability for
practitioner negligence would be vicarious or strict.
Under the fourth approach, a no-fault administrative system, no-
fault liability replaces the conventional tort lawsuit with a state admin-
istrative proceeding operating under a set of modified rules.38 Where
traditional tort doctrine requires proof of the defendant's negligence
(fault)-often the most difficult, uncertain, and contentious part of
tort litigation-in no-fault, the claimant generally must instead
demonstrate that the harm constitutes a "compensable event" under
the scheme, with no need to prove provider negligence. Sometimes
this is characterized as a shift to "strict" liability. In many versions,
damages, economic and/or non-economic, would be awarded accord-
ing to a schedule.
The fifth system is an elective no-fault proposal articulated by au-
thors of the Harvard Medical Malpractice Study.39 Under this ap-
proach, health care organizations would be authorized by statute to
offer patients, in advance of treatment, no-fault compensation for all
provider-inflicted harms in exchange for the patient's relinquishment
of any tort claims.40 No-fault benefits would fully cover medical ex-
penses unpaid by health insurance, eighty percent of net lost earnings
(up to two hundred percent of the state's average earnings level), and
specified payments for hedonic losses associated with particular physi-
cal impairments. Patients, after being fully informed of these terms,
could accept them or decline and obtain medical services elsewhere.
Effective quality assurance would be required of health care
institutions.
The final system we presented is binding arbitration. A form of al-
ternative dispute resolution, binding arbitration generally involves a
pre-treatment (in the case of managed care, often a pre-enrollment)
agreement to submit injury-based claims to an arbitrator, to be bound
by the results of the arbitration, and to relinquish recourse to the
38. See generally WEILER ET AL., supra note 1; Randall R. Bovbjerg & Frank A. Sloan, No-
Fault for Medical Injury: Theory and Evidence, 67 U. CIN. L. REv. 53 (1998); Michelle M. Mello
& Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence of Medical Errors: Theory and Evidence for Malpractice Re-
form, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1595 (2002); David M. Studdert & Troyen A. Brennan, No-Fault Compen-
sation for Medical Injuries. The Prospect for Error Prevention, 286 JAMA 217 (2001); Paul C.
Weiler, The Case for No-Fault Medical Liability, 52 MD. L. REv. 908 (1993).
39. See generally WEILER ET AL., supra note 1.
40. See id. at 148-52; WEILER, supra note 23, at 151-52 (noting, inter alia, that physicians
would be immune from tort liability under this system). As explained by its proponents, a key
distinction between this approach and wholesale mandatory no-fault is that the elective no-fault
approach would be voluntary, and it would initially "test" no-fault on a relatively small scale,
thereby avoiding the hazards of a more or less "blind leap" to a radically different, mandatory
system.
[Vol. 54:277
2005] A MULTIATTRIBUTE UTILITY ANALYSIS
courts.41 Arbitration thus shifts the forum of dispute resolution out of
the courtroom and replaces judge and jury with arbitrator(s) as deci-
sionmaker(s). Arbitration is frequently more brief and less formal,
but generally retains and applies basic principles of substantive tort
law (including liability and damages) and, often, many of its proce-
dures. The approach has been implemented by contract in some
American health care settings (e.g., parts of the Kaiser system). 42
B. Criteria
We identified eight criteria by which to measure the performance of
any system for handling medical injuries. All of our criteria reflect
widely accepted goals for injury-management regimes: compensation,
deterrence, corrective justice, and efficiency. 43 For the effects-of-sys-
41. See generally Kathy L. Cerminara, Contextualizing ADR in Managed Care: A Proposal
Aimed at Easing Tensions and Resolving Conflict, 33 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 547 (2002); Thomas B.
Metzloff, The Unrealized Potential of Malpractice Arbitration, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 203
(1996); Symposium, Medical Malpractice Dispute Resolution: A Prescription for the New Millen-
nium, 28 CAP. U. L. REV. 249 (2000).
42. See, e.g., Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 552 P.2d 1178 (Cal. 1976); Engalla v. The
Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 938 P.2d 903 (Cal. 1997).
43. There is widespread agreement that the three basic goals of tort litigation relating to medi-
cal injuries are: compensation of injured patients, deterrence or prevention of harmful conduct
and practices, and corrective justice (simply stated, that the one responsible for the harm be the
source of compensation for the one injured). See Studdert et al., supra note 23, at 283. See also
WEILER, supra note 23, at 44-47: WEILER ET AL., supra note 1, at 16-19, 20-25. But see id. at 15,
78 (discounting the importance of the "corrective justice" goal because of the widespread exis-
tence of liability insurance). Commentators also often include as an important criterion effi-
ciency, i.e., the measure of the costs of the process that detract from the payment of
compensation. See, e.g., FURROW ET AL., supra note 7, at 359,. 361. Finally, the patient safety
movement, with its emphasis on "non-punitive, systems-oriented, cooperative strategies," is in
some tension with the existing malpractice regime (Studdert et al., supra note 23, at 286), but
enables consideration of new perspectives on some of the existing criteria.
Accordingly, we included criteria, or measures, of all of the foregoing. The first three of our
criteria are measures of "compensation." The fourth through sixth are measures of "deter-
rence" or "prevention," and also incorporate novel dimensions of the patient safety movement.
The seventh is a measure of "justice," and the eighth a measure of "efficiency."
The availability and affordability of medical malpractice insurance is also sometimes discussed
as a performance criterion in connection with the tort system and with various proposed reforms
(see, e.g., FURROW ET AL., supra note 7, at 350), perhaps because it often seems to be one of the
most important factors in precipitating public debate about reform. Standing alone, however,
malpractice insurance constitutes a substantially narrower criterion of system performance than
the other factors identified above, and we accordingly did not employ it as an independent mea-
sure. For useful discussions of medical malpractice insurance, see Thomas Baker, The Under-
writing Cycle and Other Obstacles to a Stable Medical Malpractice Insurance Environment, 54
DEPAUL L. REV. 393 (2005), Mark Geistfeld, Malpractice Premiums and the (Il)legitimate Inter-
ests of the Medical Profession in Tort Reform, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 439 (2005), and Frank A.
Sloan et al., Public Medical Malpractice Insurance: An Analysis of State-Operated Patient Com-
pensation Funds, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 247 (2005) and sources cited in each.
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tems phase of data collection, 44 we asked our malpractice researcher-
scholar respondents to evaluate how well each of the six systems was
likely to perform with respect to each criterion. By contrast, for the
importance-of-criteria phase of data collection, we asked all of the re-
spondents to rate the importance of the criteria as measures of the
overall performance of any medical injury management regime.
These criteria were the following:
1. MOST NEARLY FULL AND COMPLETE COMPENSATION OF THOSE
INJURED PATIENTS WHO BRING CLAIMS:
This criterion is the (most nearly) complete compensation of those
who bring valid claims. Compensation, as used here, includes both
special losses (e.g., lost earnings, medical expenses) and general
losses (e.g., pain, suffering, disability, disfigurement).
2. ESSENTIAL COMPENSATION FOR THE LARGEST NUMBER OF IN-
JURED PATIENTS:
This criterion is the provision of "economic" compensation (special
losses: lost earnings, medical expenses, and so on) to the largest
number of injured patients.
3. PREDICTABLE COMPENSATION:
This criterion is the predictability of compensation.
4. INCENTIVE FOR INDIVIDUAL PROFESSIONALS TO AVOID THE OC-
CURRENCE OF ADVERSE EVENTS:
This criterion is the incentive for individual professionals to take
care not to inflict avoidable injury.
5. INCENTIVE FOR INSTITUTIONS OR INDUSTRY TO DEVELOP MEANS
TO AVOID OCCURRENCE OF ADVERSE EVENTS:
This criterion is the incentive for organizational units within the
health care industry, or some industry-wide organization, to take
whatever steps they can to reduce the incidence of avoidable
injuries.
6. FACILITATION OF COMMUNICATION AMONG MEMBERS OF
HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATIONS, So THAT ADVERSE EVENT PRE-
VENTION SYSTEMS CAN BE DEVELOPED:
This criterion is the facilitation of (rather than interference with)
safety regimes designed to prevent adverse medical events, through
information flow, organizational restructuring, or other steps.
7. CORRECTIVE JUSTICE:
This criterion is the compensation of an injured person by the indi-
vidual or institution responsible for inflicting his harm, rather than
by someone else (such as by a collective fund or by the injured
patient).
8. MINIMIZATION OF TRANSACTION COSTS:
This criterion is the transfer of compensation dollars from their
source to an injured patient with the least loss of dollars to ineffi-
ciencies of collection, third party profits, determination of eligibility
for the compensation, and so on.
44. See infra Part IV.
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IV. METHOD
Two separate data collections were necessary to conduct the
MAUA. The first involved ratings by experts of the systems concern-
ing their effectiveness on the defined criteria. The second involved
judgments by a number of groups regarding the importance of each of
those criteria. Two separate web-based surveys were constructed, one
for each component of the data collection.
A. Ratings of System Effects
Twenty experts participated in this portion of the study. These ex-
perts were chosen based on prior scholarly work that showed that they
were highly knowledgeable about the empirical phenomena of medi-
cal malpractice systems (e.g., having conducted original empirical re-
search or written reviews of that literature). Accordingly, they were
drawn from a national (indeed, an international) domain of such
scholars.
The participating experts were directed to a website, where they
were asked to rate each of the six systems 45 by their likely effective-
ness in achieving the goals defined by eight criteria.46 Respondents
could see definitions of each system and each criterion simply by plac-
ing their computer's cursor on the name of the system or criterion
they wanted more information about. Respondents were instructed to
indicate how well each criterion was likely to be achieved within each
system by entering a value on a scale from 0-100, where a score of 100
would indicate that a particular system fully achieved a particular cri-
terion. Thus, expert respondents were asked to make forty-eight sys-
tems-by-criteria ratings.4 7
B. Ratings of Importance of Criteria
Members of a number of different groups were recruited to supply
normative judgments about the criteria. These groups consisted of at-
torneys, physicians, tort professors, judges, and laypersons. In addi-
tion, lawyers were differentiated into those who primarily represent
plaintiffs and defendants, and physicians were differentiated into
those in "high-risk" and "low-risk" specialties. Other than the tort
professors, who were drawn nationally using the directory of the As-
sociation of American Law Schools as the sampling frame, all respon-
dents for this phase of data collection were from Arizona. Attorneys
45. See supra Part III.A.
46. See supra Part III.B.
47. A copy of the web page instructions and response grid are provided in the appendices.
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were sampled from the state bar directory and an invitation to partici-
pate was extended to them by email. 48 Names of physicians were ob-
tained from state medical directories and they were sent letters
inviting them to participate;49 they were given the choice of complet-
ing an enclosed paper questionnaire or going to a web-based question-
naire. Judges were obtained by having hard copy questionnaires
handed to them at an annual state judicial conference or in their
chambers by the chief trial judges of the two largest counties. They,
too, were offered the option of filling out the paper version of the
questionnaire or visiting the project website. Laypersons were non-
law faculty and staff from our home university, using the campus di-
rectory as the sampling frame. The obtained sample sizes were as fol-
lows: eleven plaintiffs' attorneys, five defense attorneys, twelve
physicians in low-risk specialties, eighteen physicians in high-risk spe-
cialties, fourteen judges, thirteen tort professors, and twelve
laypersons.
Except as noted above, respondents were directed to a website
where they were presented with the eight criteria (along with addi-
tional information defining and explaining each criterion) and asked
to rate the importance of each criterion. More specifically, partici-
pants were asked to indicate their "judgment" of each criterion in
light of "what is best for the overall benefit of society. '50  Respon-
dents were asked to rate how important they felt each criterion was on
a one to ten scale, where ten represented the highest importance. 51
48. Attorneys were asked an additional question: Approximately what percentage of their
cases involve the representation of tort plaintiffs or defendants? We used those responses to
divide attorneys into those who principally represented plaintiffs (being those who indicated that
at least ninety percent of their cases involved tort plaintiff representation) or attorneys with
"defense/balanced" caseloads (those whose caseloads consisted of zero to fifty percent plaintiff
representation). For simplicity, we refer to the former group as "plaintiffs'" attorneys and the
latter group as "defense" attorneys.
49. The physicians solicited as respondents consisted, in approximately equal numbers, of
board-certified specialists in internal medicine and family practice (both of which we character-
ize as "low-risk" in terms of malpractice liability, and consider together for purposes of data
collection and analysis), and neurosurgeons and obstetricians/gynecologists (both of which we
characterize as "high-risk," and consider together for purposes of data collection and analysis).
To the extent that malpractice premiums across specialties are a measure of exposure, these
choices reflect the relatively low or high malpractice premiums paid by Arizona physicians in
these several specialties.
50. This language was used to try to orient respondents to concerns broader than their own, or
their group's, self-interest.
51. A copy of the web page instructions and answer form are provided in the appendices.
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V. RESULTS
The medians of each group's ratings of the respective criteria for
evaluating legal system responses to medical injury were used to re-
present the criteria weights for their group. The medians of the ex-
perts' ratings of probable impact on the forty-eight system-by-
criterion ratings were used to compute the utilities presented below.
We relied on the medians, rather than means, as the more stable mea-
sure of central tendency. 52
First, we will discuss the differences in values placed on the various
criteria by the different groups. Then we will present the results of the
utility analysis.
A. Values Placed on the Different Criteria
Figure A presents the median ratings of the different criteria, aggre-
gated across all of the groups. 53 Communication within the medical
profession (in order to find ways to reduce the incidence of iatrogenic
injuries)54 and deterrence of industry were rated significantly higher
than the other criteria, while corrective justice was viewed as having
the lowest value among the various criteria.55 It is interesting to note
that compensation of any kind was not the most highly valued crite-
rion. Instead, mechanisms for reducing the incidence of harm to fu-
ture patients, such as communication and deterrence, were valued
highest.
Also noteworthy is the variability in judgments of the different cri-
teria.56 The group medians varied the least (showing the greatest con-
sensus) for the importance of facilitating communication and
52. Means are the arithmetic average of a set of data. Accordingly, they are sensitive to every
datum in the set, including aberrations, errors, and outliers. Medians are the middle score in a
distribution. In order for a median to change, data need to move from below to above or vice
versa.
53. An 8 (criterion) x 7 (respondent group) mixed-factor analysis of variance (ANOVA) was
conducted for this analysis. The different criteria were rated significantly differently from each
other. F (7, 525) = 5.60, p < .01.
54. latrogenic injuries, injuries caused by the healer, are the subject of this Symposium.
55. Deviation contrasts showed that the mean corrective justice rating is significantly lower
than the mean of the other criteria ratings, F (1, 81) = 13.57, p < .001. The communication
criterion rated significantly higher than the mean of the other criteria ratings, F (1, 81) = 17.29, p
< .001, as did the deterrence of industry criterion, F (1, 81) = 15.23, p < .01. Note that our
statistical tests employ raw scores and compare means, while the descriptive statistics we report
in the tables below report the group medians. In an exploratory study such as this one, we
thought it best to present the more stable medians in the tables of findings, while at the same
time conducting more sensitive significance tests in a search for differences.
56. See infra tbl. 1.
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providing essential compensation u The greatest variability (least
consensus) was observed for the value of providing full and complete
compensation to the largest number of injured patients and for correc-
tive justice. 8
As shown in Table 1, the data can be disaggregated by respondent
group,5 9 so that we are able to see whether the various groups differ-
entially valued the criteria. Overall, there was no significant differ-
ence among groups-that is, some groups did not on average and
overall give higher or lower ratings than the others.6 ° However, on
four of the criteria the respondent groups differed in their value rat-
ings: full compensation, predictable compensation, individual deter-
rence, and corrective justice.61
When valuing full compensation, physicians in both high-risk and
low-risk specialties rated full compensation of victims as a less impor-
tant goal than did plaintiffs' attorneys, defense attorneys, judges, and
57. Medians for facilitating communication ranged from 7.5 to 10 and for essential compensa-
tion from 6.5 to 9.
58. Medians for full and complete compensation ranged from 5 to 10 and for corrective justice
from 4 to 10.
59. See infra tbl. 1.
60. The groups of respondents did not differ significantly on their overall ratings of the crite-
ria, F (6, 75) = 1.80, p .11.
61. See infra tbl. 1.
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laypersons.62 In addition, tort professors regarded full compensation
as less important than did laypersons, judges, and plaintiffs'
attorneys.63
In valuing predictable compensation, plaintiffs' attorneys regarded
the goal of predictable compensation as having less value than did
laypersons, torts professors, and physicians in both high-risk and low-
risk specialties. 64 In addition, judges placed less value on predictabil-
ity of compensation than did laypersons or physicians in high-risk
specialties. 65
When valuing individual deterrence, plaintiffs' attorneys saw the
deterrence of individuals as being significantly more important than
did torts professors or physicians in low or high-risk specialties.
66
Physicians in low-risk specialties saw individual deterrence as being
less important than did defense attorneys or laypersons.67
When valuing corrective justice, plaintiffs' attorneys saw signifi-
cantly greater value in corrective justice than did physicians in both
low-risk and high-risk specialties, judges, or torts professors. 68 Fur-
ther, both defense attorneys and laypersons valued corrective justice
more than physicians did.69
We should not lose sight of the variables that the groups did not rate
significantly differently: essential compensation, deterrence of error
by motivating the medical industry, communication, and efficiency or
transaction costs. 70 The lack of differences suggests something of a
consensus among the groups on the relative importance of these goals.
Certain other differences among the patterns displayed by the dif-
ferent groups might be worth noting. Laypersons placed relatively
high value on all of the attributes of medical accident response sys-
tems. 71 Laypersons, as the people with the most unvarnished stake in
an effective system of legal response, placed a high value on just about
62. See infra tbl. 1. A one-way univariate ANOVA, comparing across groups, yields F (6, 77)
= 6.995, p < .001.
63. All of the comparisons in the preceding two sentences were significant by the least signifi-
cant difference post-hoc test (LSD) at significance levels ranging from p < .001 to p < .028.
64. See infra tbl. 1. F (6, 77) = 3.782, p = .002.
65. All of the comparisons in the preceding two sentences were significant at levels ranging
from p < .001 to p < .032.
66. See infra tbl. 1. F (6, 78) = 2.538, p = .025.
67. All of the comparisons in the preceding two sentences were significant at levels ranging
from p < .002 to p < .048.
68. See infra tbl. 1. F (6, 77) = 4.996, p = .001.
69. All of the comparisons in the preceding two sentences were significant at levels ranging
from p < .001 to p < .023.
70. See infra tbl. 1.
71. Note that none of their median ratings was lower than 8.0. See infra tbl. 1.
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TABLE 1: MEDIANS OF CRITERIA RATINGS (DISAGGREGATED BY
RESPONDENT GROUPS)
Comp: Comp: Comp: Deterrence: Deterrence: Commu- Corrective
Full Essential Predictable Individual Industry nication Justice Efficiency
Def/Bal Ls 8.5 7.5 6.5 10.0 10.0 10.0 8.0 5.0
PI Ls 10.0 7.0 5.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 5.0
Lo-Risk Docs 6.0 6.5 8.0 6.0 7.0 8.5 4.0 8.0
Hi-Risk Docs 5.0 6.5 9.0 7.5 6.5 8.0 4.0 9.0
Judges 10.0 7.0 5.0 8.0 8.5 7.5 5.0 6.5
Tort Profs 6.0 9.0 7.0 8.0 8.0 9.0 5.0 7.0
Laypersons 9.0 8.0 8.5 8.5 9.0 9.5 8.0 8.0
everything, which is perhaps understandable, though "having it all" is
likely impossible. 72 Professional groups, on the other hand, placed
value on the criteria in ways that seem to reflect their more special-
ized concerns or interests.73
Both plaintiffs' and defense attorneys placed higher value on full
compensation and on individual deterrence than did a number of
other groups.74 Plaintiffs' attorneys placed lower value on predictable
compensation than did several of the other groups.75 Corrective jus-
tice was viewed as more important by plaintiffs' attorneys than by
most other groups, and more important by defense attorneys than by
either physician groups.76 No significant differences emerged between
plaintiffs' and defense attorneys in the values they assigned to any of
the eight goals.77
Physicians stand out for placing a significantly lower value on full
compensation, higher value on predictable compensation, a lower
value on deterrence, and lower value on corrective justice78 than most
of the other groups. In regard to other criteria, physicians placed their
highest value on minimizing transaction costs, 7 9 and their next highest
72. The reluctance to trade away some benefits in order to gain others could be dealt with in
future research by requiring respondents to divide a fixed number of points among the criteria.
73. See supra tbl. 1. Perhaps the data empirically confirm George Bernard Shaw's observa-
tion about professions vis-d-vis the laity. See generally GEORGE BERNARD SHAW, THE Doc-
TOR'S DILEMMA act I (Penguin Books 1946) (1911).
74. See supra tbl. 1.
75. See supra tbl. 1.
76. See supra tbl. 1.
77. The difference between plaintiffs' and defense attorneys is not significant for any single
criterion; even for corrective justice the significance level was only p = .45.
78. In addition, a one-way repeated measures ANOVA with deviation contrasts shows that
physicians (combined into one large group) rated corrective justice far lower than they rated any
other goal. F (1, 27) = 20.10, p < .001. See supra tbl. 1.
79. F (1, 27) = 7.13, p < .05.
[Vol. 54:277
A MULTIATTRIBUTE UTILITY ANALYSIS
on facilitation of communication. 0 Thus, physicians, more than other
groups, prefer legal system responses that are predictable and afford
more modest compensation. 81 They reject responses that provide de-
terrence and more complete compensation, while also valuing the fa-
cilitation of communication within the profession to help reduce the
incidence of iatrogenic injuries. 82
Judges placed a higher value on full compensation and a lower
value on predictable compensation than did several other groups, and
a lower value on corrective justice than did plaintiffs' attorneys.8 3
Meanwhile, tort professors regarded full compensation as less impor-
tant than did a number of other groups, and differed from plaintiffs'
attorneys in valuing predictable compensation more, and individual
deterrence and corrective justice less.8 4
Table 2 presents the correlations among the importance ratings
given by the several groups, indicating which groups tend to see more
eye-to-eye on the desired goals of legal responses to medical injury.
The highest correlations were between defense and plaintiffs' attor-
neys (.887), and between doctors in low-risk and high-risk specialties
(.873).85 Whether this is surprising or not may depend on whether
one focuses on the fact that plaintiffs' and defense attorneys approach
trials from opposite sides and represent contending interests, or on the
fact that they share in the law's basic assumptions and work under the
same rules of law. In the case of doctors, one might focus on the fact
that low-risk specialists (in our sample, primary care physicians) gen-
erally have different relationships to their patients than high-risk spe-
cialists. One might also focus on the likelihood that both groups view
the current-or probably any-legal response system as a device prin-
cipally for calling them to account or changing their behavior.
80. F (1, 27) = 713, p < .05.
81. See supra tbl. 1.
82. See supra tbl. 1.
83. See supra tbl. 1.
84. A multivariate ANOVA confirmed that different groups differed in the pattern of ratings
that they gave the different criteria. The sum of the e roots derived from criteria ratings was
significant, F (48, 438) = 1.77, p < .01, and Pillai's Trace = .975. Subsequent univariate tests
indicated that groups differed on their ratings of the four criteria. See supra text accompanying
notes 61-69.
85. See infra tbl. 2. These correlations are based on the values presented in Table 1. See supra
tbl. 1. Thus, they are correlations of group medians, and the sample size of the groups is only
eight. This should be taken into consideration when interpreting the significance of the correla-
tions. Those correlations with absolute values between .887 and .658 are significant at p < .10;
those between .607 and .517 are significant at p < .20. All correlations reported in the text are
significant at p < .20, which we suggest is still quite conservative given the sample size on which
the correlations are based.
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TABLE 2: CORRELATIONS AMONG MEDIANS
Lo-Risk Hi-Risk
Plaintiff Ls Does Docs Judges Tort Profs Laypersons
Def/Bal Ls 0.887 -0.180 -0.332 0.535 0.329 0.680
Plaintiff Ls 
-0.493 -0.658 0.536 -0.049 0.525





Interestingly, the system-performance values of laypersons corre-
lated more strongly with those of defense attorneys (.680) (who would
oppose their interests if they ever brought a claim) than with those of
plaintiffs' attorneys (.525) (who would prosecute their interests). 86
Tort professors' preferred values for the system correlated somewhat
highly with those of physicians in low-risk specialties (.607) and some-
what less with physicians in high-risk specialties (.517).87 Judges' val-
ues correlated very similarly, and moderately, with both plaintiffs'
(.536) and defense (.535) attorneys, and also with laypersons (.580). s8
The strongest negative correlations (reflecting opposite rank order-
ings of values) were between physicians in high-risk specialties and
plaintiffs' attorneys (-.658).89 This finding suggests that these groups
not only have opposed interests, but also that they have more funda-
mental differences in the values that they think legal responses to
medical injury should advance and the goals the legal responses
should seek to attain.
B. Utilities
Recall that each system-by-criterion rating of efficacy was weighted
by the importance of that criterion, and then the utilities were
summed across criteria to produce a utility for each system. Utilities
were calculated for each system not only by the lights of each group
providing normative ratings, but also by using different sets of criteria.
These variations are reflected in the tables below.90 The purpose of
86. See supra tbl. 2. The correlation with defense attorneys is significant at p < .10, while that
with plaintiffs' attorneys is significant at p < .20.
87. See supra tbl. 2.
88. See supra tbl. 2.
89. See supra tbl. 2. Plaintiffs' attorneys and physicians in low-risk specialties correlated -.493,
a value not significantly different from zero at p < .20 given the low power of the available
significance test.
90. See infra tbls. 3-7. In the significance tests reported below, the significance of repeated-
measures effects are calculated using the Greenhouse-Geisser Correction, since the sphericity
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employing different sets of criteria was to see the extent to which the
utilities associated with different systems are robust and whether the
order of preferences remains stable as various criteria are used in cal-
culating utilities.
1. All Criteria91
Overall-that is, combining the values of all groups-Administra-
tive No-Fault and the Harvard No-Fault proposal accumulated the
highest total utilities. 92 At the other end of the spectrum, with the
lowest utility, was Modified-Reformed Tort.93 This system was found
to have the lowest utility by the values of each and every group-
though it may be that different groups disdain it for different
reasons.
94
TABLE 3: UTILITIEs DERIVED FROM ALL CRITERIA
Lo-Risk Hi-Risk
Def Ls PI Ls Docs Docs Judges Tort Profs Laypersons Totals
Tort 3645 3835 2695 3088 3125 3015 3655 23,058
Mod/Ref Tort 2860 2960 2253 2525 2475 2475 2928 18,476
Enterprise Liab 3345 3460 2690 2935 2960 2900 3460 21,750
No-Fault Admin 4005 4010 3560 3802 3643 3800 4330 27,150
Harvard No-Fault 3705 3715 3260 3492 3358 3485 3988 25,003
Binding Arb 3288 3420 2663 2963 2908 2870 3440 21,552
Totals 20,848 21,400 17,121 18,805 18,469 18,545 21,801
Next, we disaggregate by respondent groups, through whose eyes
the utilities of the different systems are seen to differ.95 Examination
of Table 3 suggests the following pattern of differences. Based upon
the values of defense attorneys, physicians in high-risk specialties,
judges, tort professors, and laypersons, the systems with the greatest
assumption has been violated. All between-subjects pairwise comparisons are made using the
Tukey HSD test. All within-subjects pairwise comparisons are made using the Bonferroni
Correction.
91. See infra tbl. 3 (this analysis included all eight individual criteria).
92. See infra tbl. 3.
93. See infra tbl. 3.
94. A one-way repeated measure ANOVA with a deviation contrast was conducted on re-
spondents' individual utilities. Both Administrative No-Fault, F (1, 83) = 634.14, p < .001, and
Harvard No-Fault, F (1, 83) = 240.73, p <.001, were of significantly more utility than the remain-
ing systems. Modified-Reformed Tort was found to be of significantly less utility than the other
systems, F (1, 83) = 2158.85, p < .001.
95. A 6 (system) x 7 (respondent group) mixed-factor ANOVA was conducted on the calcu-
lated utilities. A significant interaction was found, meaning that each system's calculated utility
(and its relative position among the different systems) differed between the respondent groups,
F (30, 385) = 3.64. p < .001.
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utility, in descending order, were: Administrative No-Fault, Harvard
No-Fault, and Conventional Tort.96 The values of plaintiffs' attorneys
led to the same three systems having the greatest utility, except the
order was slightly changed: Administrative No-Fault had the greatest
utility, followed by Conventional Tort, and then Harvard No-Fault. 97
Based upon the values of physicians in low-risk specialties, Adminis-
trative No-Fault had the greatest utility and Harvard No-Fault the sec-
ond greatest; the utility of other systems did not come anywhere near
these two systems.98
2. Major Criteria (Indexed)99
For this analysis, we created a single index of compensation (by
averaging the ratings given to the three compensation criteria), a sin-
gle index of deterrence (by averaging the ratings given to the two de-
terrence criteria), and used only those two indices to reflect the two
major criteria: compensation and deterrence. The third "major crite-
rion" employed for this analysis was transaction costs.























































Binding Arb 1025 1010 1045 1099 1049 1067 1224 7519
Totals 6704 6610 6802 7143 6846 6960 7978
Using those three criteria, over all respondent groups, the utility
derived for each system was found to be significantly different from
the utility for every other system. As is evident from Table 4, Admin-
istrative No-Fault and Harvard No-Fault had the highest utilities, con-
siderably outdistancing the other systems. 100 Modified-Reformed
Tort had the lowest utility of all the systems examined and Conven-
96. See supra tbl. 3.
97. See supra tbl. 3.
98. See supra tbl. 3.
99. See infra tbl. 4.
100. See supra tbl. 4.
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tional Tort had the next to lowest utility.11 The pattern described
above and shown in Table 4 held for every one of the respondent
groups separately. 0 2
3. Major Criteria (Indexed) Plus Communication0 3
This analysis used the same criteria as the analysis in the immedi-
ately preceding subsection, except that ratings of communication were
added into the utility calculations.
TABLE 5: UTILITIES DERIVED FROM MAJOR CRITERIA PLUS
FACILITATION OF COMMUNICATION
Lo-Risk Hi-Risk
Def Ls PI Ls Docs Docs Judges Tort Profs Laypersons Totals
Tort 1340 1326 1217 1246 1223 1289 1444 9,085
Mod/Ref Tort 1254 1243 1182 1219 1150 1229 1372 8,649
Enterprise Liab 1506 1491 1434 1483 1396 1487 1663 10,460
No-Fault Admin 2233 2213 2209 2300 2119 2258 2531 15,863
Harvard No-Fault 1996 1977 1968 2049 1896 2016 2261 14,163
Binding Arb 1525 1510 1470 1524 1424 1517 1699 10,669
Totals 9,854 9,760 9.480 9,821 9,208 9,796 10,970
Once again, over all respondent groups, Administrative No-Fault
and Harvard No-Fault showed the highest utility, while Modified-Re-
formed Tort had the lowest, and Conventional Tort had the second
lowest utility. 10 4 The disaggregated results for each respondent group
reproduce the overall pattern described above and shown in Table
5.105
101. See supra tbl. 4. A 6 (system) x 7 (respondent group) mixed-factor ANOVA was con-
ducted on the individual utilities of the criteria included for this analysis. A main effect of sys-
tem was found: different systems had significantly different utilities, F (5, 390) = 1324.00, p <
.001. Pairwise comparisons with the Bonferroni Correction revealed that each system had signif-
icantly different utilities from every other system.
102. See supra tbl. 4. No main effect of respondent group was found, F (6, 78) = 0.74, p = ns.
No system x group interaction was found, F (30, 390) = 1.14, p = ns, meaning that by each
group's value judgements, the patterns of utilities were the same across groups.
103. See infra tbl. 5.
104. See supra tbl. 5. A 6 (system) x 7 (respondent group) mixed-factor ANOVA was con-
ducted on the individual utilities of the criteria included for this analysis. A main effect of sys-
tem was found: different systems had significantly different utilities, F (5, 390) = 1144.53, p <
.001. Pairwise comparisons with the Bonferroni Correction revealed each system had signifi-
cantly different utilities from every other system.
105. See supra tbl. 5. No main effect of the respondent group was found, F (6, 78) = 1.04, p =
ns. No system x group interaction was found, F (30, 390) = 1.45, p = ns, meaning that by each
group's value judgements, the patterns of utilities were the same across groups.
298 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:277
4. Major Criteria (Indexed) Plus Corrective Justice10 6
In this analysis, corrective justice replaced communication as the
fourth criterion in the model.
TABLE 6: UTILITIES DERIVED FROM MAJOR CRITERIA PLUS
CORRECTIVE JUSTICE
Lo-Risk Hi-Risk
Def Ls PI Ls Docs Docs Judges Tort Profs Laypersons Totals
Tort 1580 1726 1197 1546 1323 1329 1704 10,405
Mod/Ref Tort 1204 1293 999 1236 1063 1074 1345 8,214
Enterprise Liab 1406 1491 1209 1458 1271 1287 1588 9,710
No-Fault Admin 1773 1813 1734 1945 1744 1778 2106 12,893
Harvard No-Fault 1636 1677 1578 1779 1596 1626 1931 11,823
Binding Arb 1505 1610 1285 1579 1349 1367 1704 10,399
Totals 9,104 9,610 8,002 9,543 8,346 8,461 10,378
Overall, the now-familiar pattern holds-with Administrative No-
Fault and Harvard No-Fault having the greatest utility and Modified-
Reformed Tort the lowest-though Conventional Tort and Binding
Arbitration rose to the tier of highest utility after the No-Fault sys-
tems. 107 Examination of the disaggregated patterns across groups in-
dicated more variation from respondent group to respondent group,
but no clear pattern of differences emerged. 108
5. Selected Individual (Highest Valued) Criteria09
This analysis employed the three individual criteria that received
the highest ratings from all of the respondent groups combined (with
the limitation that only one criterion was included reflecting each gen-
106. See infra tbl. 6.
107. See supra tbl. 6. A 6 (system) x 7 (respondent group) mixed-factor ANOVA was con-
ducted on the individual utilities of the criteria included for this analysis. A main effect of sys-
tem was found: different systems had significantly different utilities, F (5, 390) = 428.60, p < .001.
Pairwise comparisons with the Bonferroni Correction revealed that each system had significantly
different utilities from every other system.
108. See supra tbl. 6. A main effect of respondent group was found, F (6, 78) = 2.73, p < .05.
A system x group interaction was found, F (30, 390) = 3.18, p < .01, meaning that by the values of
different groups, the pattern of systems' utilities differed. Pairwise comparisons using the Tukey
HSD test showed that, although a significant main effect of respondent group exists, no individ-
ual groups are significantly different from any other groups. Although the system x group inter-
action is significant, the Administrative No-Fault system had the highest utility across all groups
(all ps < .05). The Modified-Reformed Tort system had the lowest utility across all groups (all ps
< .05).
109. See infra tbl. 7.
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eral issue (e.g., one from compensation, one from deterrence)), 110 plus
transaction costs." I The criteria used in this analysis, then, were: fa-
cilitation of communication, industry-wide deterrence, full and com-
plete compensation, and minimization of transaction costs.'
12
TABLE 7: UTILITIEs DERIVED FROM SELECTED CRITERIA
Lo-Risk Hi-Risk
Def Ls PI Ls Docs Docs Judges Tort Profs Laypersons Totals
Tort 1738 1850 1370 1285 1690 1430 1755 11,118
Mod/Ref Tort 1475 1550 1238 1195 1415 1275 1523 9,671
Enterprise Liab 1995 2100 1655 1590 1930 1710 2055 13,035
No-Fault Admin 2245 2350 2040 2022 2212 2050 2430 15,349
Harvard No-Fault 2053 2150 1845 1823 2023 1860 2210 13,964
Binding Arb 1820 1925 1555 1505 1793 1585 1915 12,098
Totals 11,326 11,925 9,703 9,420 11,063 9,910 11,888
The findings overall place Administrative No-Fault and Harvard
No-Fault in the top ranks, but for the first time Enterprise Liability
approaches the utility of the No-Fault systems.113 The overall pattern
was reproduced by the values of plaintiffs' and defense attorneys,
judges, laypersons, and to a slightly lesser extent, tort professors. The
main departure from the pattern was for both low-risk and high-risk
physicians, by whose assessments Enterprise Liability did not come as
close to No-Fault systems as it did by the valuations of the other
groups, though it still had the third highest utility.
114
110. This is another way to avoid double counting where we had a "family" of criteria-which
we did with compensation and deterrence-as an alternative to the "indices" of these measures
used above. See supra note 109 and infra notes 111-114 and accompanying text.
111. The forced inclusion of transaction costs is based on our assumption that any serious
reform of the medical injury response system will be sensitive to costs and aim to gain the most
benefits with the least wasted resources.
112. See infra tbl. 7. See also infra fig. A.
113. See infra tbl. 7. A 6 (system) x 7 (respondent group) mixed-factor ANOVA was con-
ducted on the individual utilities of the criteria included for this analysis. A main effect of sys-
tem was found: different systems had significantly different utilities, F (5, 390) = 848.52, p < .001.
Pairwise comparisons with the Bonferroni Correction revealed that each system was significantly
different from every other system.
114. See supra tbl. 7. A main effect of respondent group was found, F (6, 78) = 2.45 p < .05.
A system x group interaction was found, F (30, 390) = 2.06, p <.05, meaning that by the values of
different groups, the pattern of systems' utilities differed. Pairwise comparisons using the Tukey
HSD test showed that, although a significant main effect of respondent group exists, no individ-
ual group's values produced system utilities different from any other group's values. Although
the system x group interaction was significant, the Administrative No-Fault system had the high-
est utility across all groups (all ps < .05). The Modified-Reformed Tort system had the lowest
utility across all groups (all ps < .05).
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VI. CONCLUSION
With respect to judgments of the importance of the various criteria,
respondents were concerned primarily with the prevention of injuries.
The single most important criterion for respondents was facilitating
communication within the medical community. This criterion enables
the development of reforms aimed at reducing the incidence of ia-
trogenic injury. Close behind in importance was deterrence to moti-
vate injury prevention. This presents a challenge to designers of
reforms, because while it is thought that elimination of a fault-based
system would facilitate communication, such systems also are likely to
diffuse responsibility in ways likely to vitiate deterrence. In any event,
it is clear that respondents generally placed high value on steps that
would prevent iatrogenic injuries-with the exception of high-risk
physicians (for whom the most important goal is the minimization of
transaction costs and the predictability of compensation) and judges
(for whom the principal goal of the law's response to medical injury
should be the full compensation of victims).
Through most of the above analyses, Administrative No-Fault and
Harvard No-Fault emerged as the systems with the highest utilities,
suggesting that they are so robust as to withstand variations in choice
of criteria and among the respondent groups. Conventional Tort and
Binding Arbitration approach the utility of the No-Fault alternatives
only when corrective justice is included among the criteria used to
compute utilities. Enterprise Liability approaches the No-Fault alter-
natives only when the highest valued criteria are used to compute the
utilities.
As noted at the outset, these findings should not be regarded as
providing any sort of definitive answer to the questions addressed.
Rather, this project is a demonstration of how one could usefully pro-
ceed to fashion the most beneficial kind of system for responding to
the problem of medical injuries, in light of the criteria that are most
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